derstood and hence under-utilized. As I will describe, the use of empathy, properly grounded, can be a powerful tool for collecting more data, and more reliable data, in the field. In particular, I will describe how the use of empathy deepened the comprehension of the metaphysical and ethical dimensions of the lives of American Buddhists while it dissolved obstacles to data collection arising from the side of the researcher. Unfortunately, although reflexive ethnography is specifically conceived to avoid exploiting field subjects, the ethics of ethnography are not always straightforward. Employing empathy in reflexive ethnography raised thorny ethical questions that deserve discussion. These dimensions of the scientific use of empathy are explored in this article, which begins with the experimental ethnographic context into which reflexive ethnography fits.
methods of reflexive ethnography and empathy
Reflexive ethnographic methods are the rebellious heirs to older, classical methods of ethnography as developed in the early twentieth century and epitomized by Malinowski's (1922) 'participant observation' approach in the first chapter of Argonauts of the Western Pacific. This method of participant observation grounded anthropology's twin tasks of portraying a foreign culture to a Western audience in its unfamiliar character, while also making this unfamiliar character seem familiar to the same Western audience. This portrayal, however, needed to carry the weight of social science methods and theories so that anthropological ethnographies would be more authoritative than the genres of journalism and travelogue. Ethnographies pursued this end through two allied methodological strategies (Rabinow, 1986: 244) . The first strategy evoked the ethnographer's authority due to the fact of the ethnographer's 'being there' in the field with 'the natives,' so that data were reliable because they were collected directly by the ethnographer herself. This dimension may be seen in a variety of experiential statements, usually relegated to prefaces and footnotes. The second strategy involved the suppression of this first-person voice in the body of the text, which instead relied on seemingly objective, third-person statements like 'The Ojibwa believe...' Through these rhetorical strategies readers were led to believe, at least ideally, that a credentialed scientist was there to collect the data yet did not personally contaminate it.
Many writers in recent years have attacked the pretenses and fallacies of this ethnographic attitude. Vincent Crapanzano has been a leading voice in this critique. According to Crapanzano, this ethnographic paradigm is impossible to fulfill, either in the field or in textual construction, because each ethnographic project arises in the context of Western social scientific pursuit, yet it demands the depiction of a foreign world presumably on it own terms. Therefore, the ethnographer must be a Western social scientist and an unscientific native all at once. From this, for Crapanzano the ethnographer must play the role of a rhetorical 'trickster' in order to create a convincing, authoritative text (Crapanzano, 1986: 52) . Through a critique of ethnographic texts of George Catlin, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and Clifford Geertz, Crapanzano reveals these rhetorical 'trickster' strategies which, while enriching and enlivening the text, preclude any pretense of representing positivist science or even truly representing the point of view of field subjects. Compounding this, the classical paradigm inherently involves a static, ahistorical picture of a complete social world, whereas the ethnographic encounter is always diachronic, processual, and fragmented (ibid.: 51), and societies can never be experienced in their totality by any one human being (Thornton, 1992: 18-19) . The effacement of the ethnographer from the text produced by these classical methods thus is not objective science, but in fact represents a practice of 'bad faith' (Crapanzano, 1980: ix) .
Many other scholars attack the classical paradigm of ethnography for its practice of the elimination of the ethnographer in data collection and finished text, for its 'prejudice against prejudice' (Nowak, 1984: 171) . Dominant among concerns in this critique is the need to pay attention to the dialogic, not monologic, nature of the ethnographic project. The elimination of the ethnographer, intended to create an aura of authoritative objectivity, is in fact scientifically false (Rabinow, 1986: 245) , as it creates an 'illusion of objectivity without involvement' (Herdt and Stoller, 1990: 24) . With its monologic structure, the classical paradigm fails to make researcher bias, prior understandings, and prejudices an explicit part of the research process. Erasing the researcher from the ethnographic project obscures subjectivity in the research design, the research setting, the data collected, and the final report. An unfortunate residue of nineteenth century positivism, the classical ethnographic paradigm therefore is epistemologically untrustworthy and naïve. This critique insists that ethnographic epistemology be brought in line with other epistemological paradigms such as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in the natural sciences or Gadamer's hermeneutic approach to the social sciences. From a more postmodern perspective, it is more scientific to highlight the dialogic encounter between the researcher and the researched both in the field and in the final report by revealing the ethnographer's participation in both data collection and write-up. A reflexive self-consciousness on the part of the researcher is essential for textual, social scientific authority, rather than an obstacle to such authority, hence the term 'reflexive ethnography.' James Clifford has been instrumental in pushing this critique further. To challenge the 'bad faith' objectivity claimed by classical ethnographies as well as to indicate new directions for paradigms, Clifford (1986b) suggests that ethnographic texts are, in both form and content, allegorical. For Clifford, cultural anthropology's principal process of rendering the foreign as famil-6 iar to Western audiences could not be anything other than allegorical. In order to gain familiarity with the material, readers must understand foreign artifacts through allegorical comparison with their own culture, so that for the reader of ethnographies allegory is a required mode. Since ethnographic texts as read are allegorical, they are also inherently multivocal. This multivocal, allegorical nature of ethnographic texts precludes any hope of a final, settled reading or positivist truth for such texts. And this allegorical moment, for Clifford, arises not just between the reader and the final text, but inheres in textual production itself. Data collection also is allegorical for the researcher, as data collection decisions, like textual readings, demand allegorical comparison.
Due to their allegorical nature, for Clifford ethnographies always involve the invention, not representation, of cultures (Clifford, 1986a: 2) . Untainted, pure representation is impossible because the encounter with field subjects is dialogic, textual production is dialogic, and textual meaning and authority are dialogic. Instead, ethnographies present unique cultural experiences deriving from the interactions of researched-researcher-text-reader. This, however, does not diminish the claim of ethnographies to scientific authority within the academy. Ethnographies are approached scientifically in terms of possessing competing voices. Scientific authority arises precisely because of the multivocal nature of the text as well as the dialogue of the text with other ethnographies. Authority is dislodged from any one individual, but rather arises in the encounter of multivocal researched-researcher-text-competing text-reader, so that reflexive ethnographies are ethnographies of 'dispersed authority' (Marcus and Cushman, 1982: 24) . Popperian falsifiability is achieved by 'the conflict between competing interpretations' (Ricoeur, 1981: 213) . Scientific authority results from the reflexive attention paid by the ethnographer to this multivocality and interpersonal implication at every level of project design, execution, and presentation.
The reflexive mode of ethnography clearly recognizes that data are always rich with the private intentions and meanings of the ethnographer (Herdt and Stoller, 1990: 34) , so that this method of ethnography attempts to exploit the relation between researcher and researched to positive scientific effect. This may be accomplished through the use of empathy as a social scientific tool, following the lead of Max Weber. Foreshadowing Heisenberg, in his seminal essay 'Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy' (1904), Weber claims that an objective scientific analysis of culture is impossible. For Weber all sciences use choices and concepts to predetermine their fields of data within the infinite variety of possible gatherable data, and therefore all sciences lack presuppositionless objectivity. This inherently interactive nature of all research, for Weber, is even more true of the social sciences. Culture, the principal object of social science research, is not objective for Weber, as culture itself is a 'value-concept' lacking in empirical existence. All knowledge of culture derives from 'particular points of view' (Weber, 1904: 81) and thus always involves the 'investigator's evaluative ideas ' (ibid.: 82) . Therefore social science epistemology inherently implicates the researcher with the researched, and the basic data of the social sciences arise from the empathic involvement of the researcher with the researched.
Empathy thus provides the foundation for Weber's verstehen method. Without empathy there is no social science because data derive solely from empathy. For Weber, this empathy makes the social sciences more scientific, not less. Naturally, this is a disciplined empathy, as the involvement is pursued to scientific ends. Empathic involvement provides the method of social scientific data collection, and then data are then oriented to causal explanations as found in the natural sciences.
To hone Weber's concept of empathy into a useful ethnographic tool, I suggest the use of the formulations of empathy found in the work of the psychologist Heinz Kohut. Kohut's theory of empathy is the most sophisticated and developed of any to be found in the corpus of psychoanalytic writings, as empathy is central to Kohut's revisionist psychoanalytic theories and practices regarding health, pathology, and the analytic process. As well, Kohut's understanding of empathy as a scientific tool parallels the understanding of social science as found in the reflexive ethnographic theories I have discussed. Kohutian empathy therefore dovetails seamlessly with reflexive ethnographic metatheory.
Kohut defines empathy in several places in his sometimes posthumously published work.
His most common definition is that empathy is 'vicarious introspection.' Augmenting this formulation is that empathy is 'the capacity to think or feel oneself into the inner life of another person' (Kohut, 1984: 82) , which resembles Freud's use of Einfühlung, to 'feel oneself into somebody' (Wolf, 1983: 309 ). Kohut's most precise definition, and the one used in the ethnographic section of this essay, is that empathy is 'cognition through the narcissistic investment of the other' (Kohut, 1978b: 701) .
As with Weber, for Kohut social scientific data only arise from empathy, and the more the social sciences stray from empathy, the more unscientific they become (Kohut, 1990: 88) .
This empathy, as a research tool and used for scientific purposes, should never be confused with compassion or sympathy. For Kohut compassion seeks the benefit of another person whereas scientific empathy bears no such aim. In fact, according to Kohut, empathy may be used to the detriment of the other. To this end he offers as an example the skillful use of Nazi radio propaganda in 1930's Germany, which was effective because of its empathic tone and content yet failed in terms of beneficial effects.
2 As a scientific tool both compassion, on one side, and faultfinding, on the other, must be eliminated from empathy, which then exists as an attitude of 'evenly hovering attention' outside of purely subjective introspection or intuition.
This 'evenly hovering attention,' without compassion or fault-finding, must derive from a reflexive self-awareness on the part of the researcher. The Kohutian concept of empathy inherently recognizes the implication of the observer with the observed (Kohut, 1980: 483-487 (Kohut, 1984: 36-37) .
To employ such reflexivity the researcher must train in the use of empathy, just as any scientific procedure requires training (Kohut, 1978b: 701) . Failures or mistakes in empathy are common occurrences both inside and outside of the research process and the use of empathy demands experience and learning from mistakes. The researcher becomes more attuned as the research progresses, a dynamic found even within classical paradigms of ethnography, as one
learns over time what is important to the researched people and the research project. Perfect empathy is not possible but, according to Ernest Wolf, is not necessary. More important than empathic success is maintaining an empathic ambience in the research situation (Wolf, 1983: 314) .
The empathic effort alone may encourage research subjects to offer data, although there may be resistance at first (Kohut, 1978a: 486) . And, as I will discuss, empathic mistakes can be quite revealing of data about the researched as well as of impedances to data collection arising from the researcher. The effort for empathy is what is required, and research only fails when this effort is lacking.
This understanding of the role of empathy in the social scientific process is extended and enriched in the work of Peter Homans (1989 pursuits are fantasy-laden data. Ethnographically, both participation and observation represent fantasy-laden activities (Homans, 1989: 340) .
research moment of experience-near empathic data collection, there follows a research moment of more experience-distant theoretical reflection on that data. During this latter, theory-creation moment, empathy for Homans and Kohut alike is dropped, and the researcher adopts Ricoeur's (1970) 'hermeneutic of suspicion.' Empathy is for data collection only, not for theory formation.
Self-reflexive understanding, however, is required in both research moments.
Having described the theoretical virtues of this ethnographic methodology, I must mention some of its problematic ethical dimensions. As with all ethnographic methods, reflexive ethnographies inevitably leave the researcher in an ethically ambiguous position. A peculiar danger with reflexive ethnography arises from the special 'betwixt and between' position of the reflexive researcher. The immersed, reflexive ethnographer, from the standpoint of field subjects, is simultaneously both 'one of us' and not. This leaves a great deal of room for unintentional exploitation by the ethnographer in pursuit of information. A practical example of this difficulty arises when field subjects forget over time that the ethnographer is an ethnographer and perceive him merely as another member of the group, despite ethnographer efforts to inform and remind subjects. I will revisit this theme later, when I will suggest that an empathic approach to reflexive ethnography may alleviate, but not fully resolve, the difficult ethical dilemmas of ethnographic research.
obstacles to data in the buddhist field
The preceding model of ethnographic empathy and reflexive 'dispersed authority' grounded my project to examine why so many non-Tibetan Americans from Christian and Jewish backgrounds are turning instead to Tibetan Buddhism as a religious option (Capper, 2002) .
To investigate my questions I undertook more than two years of fieldwork at a major Tibetan Obstacles to data collection arose from two sources. There was reticence on the part of my interpreters to participate meaningfully, and there also were obstacles, somewhat unknown to me at first, from my side as a researcher. Both of these obstacles were eventually overcome through my empathic methodology and thus are germane to this essay.
The reticence of my interpreters derived first from the unsurprising yet potent observation that people often are unresponsive to the kinds of questions that I asked, such as, 'Have you had any mystical experiences?' Interpreters were understandably shy about revealing information about such personal questions. In the beginning, those most open to answering my questions were so because they had little of value to share. Others responded by parroting doctrines gleaned from a variety of New Age sources. Quality responses were difficult to gain.
Another source of reticence from interpreters derived from an anti-intellectual atmosphere at my field site. Although some interpreters at Siddha Gompa possessed advanced university degrees and valued institutional education, many did not, having happily ended their educational careers before or right after college. Also, among virtually all interpreters there was a shared perception, openly and commonly expressed, that the research of academic Buddhologists was invalid and untrustworthy because academics do not practice Buddhism, they only write about it. For most interpreters at the gompa, Buddhism represents a set of practices designed to bring about personal transformation and ultimately liberation from samsara, the round of rebirths that is fraught with dissatisfaction. When practiced, Buddhism is quite powerful in effecting such personal transformation and ultimate liberation, but it must be practiced to be effective in this way. Therefore, not to practice Buddhism is not to understand that Buddhism tells you that you must. To be a non-practicing scholar is to miss this most essential point of the Buddhist teachings. The non-practicing scholar can at best, from this point of view, produce work that is untrustworthy or irrelevant.
Another source of reticence from my interpreters involved the sociology of Siddha Gompa knowledge. Buddhist teachings and practices at the gompa follow the hierarchical model of the guru-disciple relationship to a high degree. At Siddha Gompa it is commonly taught and understood that one achieves liberation only in and through one's relationship with a Tibetan Buddhist guru, or lama. Unstinting devotion and service to the lama provides the ultimate soteriological ground. Naturally, in this model of spirituality, the authority of the lama is paramount.
At the gompa, lamas are seen as possessing intellectual knowledge of teachings that others lack. A second obstacle to data collection derived from my own side, from the social and psychological baggage, mostly unconscious, that I brought to my field site. Despite the fact that I had done some previous fieldwork, it was not the scale that I was then attempting, and I was nervous about my capabilities to perform such an investigation. As a reflexive ethnographic bricoleur I was unsure of my location(s) (Tweed, 2002b) in the gompa social realm and I feared making major mistakes. Therefore, my demeanor was much more stiff, distant, and reserved than it usually is outside of the research setting. And, used to being at least somewhat personally trusted outside of the research setting, I found myself responding to my interpreters' distrust of me with conscious and unconscious distrust of my own. This, of course, inhibited Kohutian empathic 'evenly hovering attention.'
Perhaps more problematic than these obstacles, I provided other obstacles to research deriving from a clash of metaphysical world views. The academic womb that gave me professional birth and socialized me is highly rationalist, in which motives and actions are explained following secular psychological and sociological theories. Despite previous experiences with American Buddhists and other alternative religious groups, I found it difficult to empathize with seemingly irrational stories involving the unrestrained omniscience and omnipotence of Tibetan lamas as well as with the pervasive employment of Western and Eastern astrology for understanding the behavior of others. As David J. Hufford puts it, 'The truth claims of folk religion and the basic thrust of scholarly hermeneutics of a religion constitute a primary, fundamental conflict of interest between the scholar and those studied' (Hufford, 1999: 300) . Because of this conflict, I
lacked the capacity to fully empathize with the more 'spiritualized' world views found at Siddha Gompa.
My own unconscious processes also spawned a clash of moral perspectives. Unknown to me at the time, I arrived at Siddha Gompa with an irrational, unconscious expectation of finding a sort of moral utopia, in which practitioners would unfailingly manifest Buddhist compassion and loving-kindness. The sometimes distant and impersonal ethos of the gompa, along with natural and understandable human frailty and imperfection, destroyed this unconscious expectation rather quickly. My disappointment, not fully recognized and thus unintegrated in my personality, was not lost on my interpreters. They noticed, even if only in an inchoate way, that I had failed to properly mobilize empathy in the research setting.
blending in for insight
To overcome these obstacles to data collection, it became clear to me that the only way to get real data from my interpreters was to become more of an insider. I had to follow George Devereux's (1967: 195) dictum that to get beneath superficial details, the fieldworker must be cathected by the group being studied. Likewise, empathy declines the more dissimilar the observer is from the observed (Kohut, 1990: 86; Crapanzano, 1980: 141) . Empathy arises from 'identification by way of imitation' (Freud, 1955: 110) . I needed to employ the 'sympathetic magic' of fieldwork, in which the ethnographer appropriates knowledge through mimesis of the researched (Coleman, 2002: 76) . To understand Buddhists with scientific empathy and honesty,
I needed to open myself to becoming more of a Buddhist.
For this venture I enjoyed direction from some reflexive ethnographies. Jeanne FavretSaada (1980) lent bearing from her study of French witchcraft phenomena, which consisted of wars of words, of accusations and counteraccusations of bewitchment. While this discourse lay at the heart of her field environment, she found herself denied access due to her ethnographer status. Her interpreters offered her only trivial, misleading, untrue, or nonexistent data. After several months in a fallow field of data, she changed strategic course. In her words, she had to 'get caught' in the discourse. She adopted a more active, participatory role, in which she was willing both to accuse and to be vulnerable to accusations of witchcraft. This entrance into the essential phenomena of witchcraft she studied allowed deeper, more meaningful information to emerge from her interpreters, and her apparently stalled project suddenly came to life. An important aspect of this situation is the fact that her subjectivity, following enriched participation, allowed her access to data that otherwise would have remained hidden. Her own experience of witchcraft became her most important datum, pace Devereux (1967) . As she put it, 'For anyone who wants to understand the meaning of this discourse, there is no other solution but to practice it oneself, to become one's own informant, to penetrate one's own amnesia, and to try and make explicit what one finds unstateable in oneself' (Favret Saada, 1980: 22) . For Favret-Saada, ethnographic reflexivity runs psychologically deep. The more the ethnographer can access and uncover her own unconscious, the richer her data will be.
As another example, in her study of British witchcraft practitioners Tanya Luhrmann (1989) faced problems similar to mine in that her interpreters at first were not forthright with her.
She responded by becoming a witch herself. She adopted as fully as possible ways of thinking, practicing, and living that were like those of her interpreters. Of interest is the fact that she did not just 'blend in' or assimilate with her field site socially only, but psychologically as well. In this serious adoption of the identity of a witch Luhrmann found that her subjectivity opened up realms of information that otherwise might remain hidden. Only through her own psychological assimilation and experience could she understand what the 'real' life of witches entailed, so that her own subjectivity served as a locus of ethnographic data. She became her own informant.
However, this psychological 'blending in' ended with the subject of metaphysical world views.
Beliefs in magical actions and powers that were taken for granted by other witches could not be embraced by Luhrmann, as they conflicted with her rationalist academic world view. This inability to embrace her subjects' world view was a barrier to full participation for Luhrmann, as it was the only aspect of her experience that defined her as an ethnographer in contradistinction to her non-ethnographer subjects (Luhrmann, 1989: 320-321) .
As discussed, for my project it was obvious that I had to 'get caught' or 'blend in' my- (Preston, 1988: 10-11) . But this 'blending in' risked violating the entrenched anthropological stigma against 'going native.' 7 I took this risk by recognizing the 'part artist, part scientist' nature of religious studies research (Doniger, 1998: 76) . In Wendy Doniger's terms, to be a good academic 'sage,' I had to release my inner spiritual 'hunter' that the sage attempts to repress, since 'good sages' always have 'good hunters' inside them, anyway (O'Flaherty, 1988: 10-12 Following this, I pursued 'blending in' through several activities and some welcome good luck. First, I attended as many teachings and practices at the gompa as possible. At Siddha
Gompa pujas (deity yoga meditational and worship services) were performed daily at 5 AM for the deity Green Tara, at 5 PM for the protector deity Mahakala, and at 7 PM for Chenrezig, the 'Great Being' of compassion. I attended these rituals regularly. Over many weekends, lamas gave teachings on Friday night, Saturday, and Sunday, and I attended these as well. It was common as a part of these weekend teachings to have ceremonies for abhisheka, or ritual initiation into various subcults of Tibetan Buddhism, on Saturday nights. These I attended, giving me the full spectrum of formal ritual experience that the gompa had to offer.
This led to my authentic participation in the post-ritual sharing of subjective experiences of ceremonies that was nearly a ritual in itself. On these occasions interpreters came to understand my personal inner life and motivations more clearly, alleviating tension and building friendships. I shared both my growing appreciation for and still-cynical distance from our common ritual experiences. In so doing I discovered I was accepted for being thoughtful, for at-tempting to be and some times succeeding at being appreciative, and sometimes for harboring and voicing doubts that interpreters shared but were too timid to voice on their own. I never developed the devotion to a lama that is the central practice of the gompa, but I came to better un- As time went on, interpreters began to trust my research more. Even though I was careful to inform or remind interpreters of my status as ethnographer, I came to be perceived by some more as a Buddhist who also was an academic, rather than primarily as an academic with a shallow, intellect-only interest in Buddhism. For many of my interpreters, I had been 'caught.' My data became richer. People began telling me about mystical experiences, Buddhist lives, and everyday activities in much greater detail. Questions that previously had been difficult to approach answered themselves without being asked. Had I not taken an initial empathic stance toward fieldwork, much of this likely would have eluded me.
The empathic approach also allowed my own obstacles to data collection to diminish. By becoming my 'own informant' and empathizing with interpreters, the difficulty I shared with
Luhrmann regarding divergent metaphysical world views became instead a realm of ethnographic meaning. My greater empathic participation allowed me to see the less rationalized, more 'spiritual' world views of Siddha Gompa in action in its members, which revealed important perspectives about gompa culture. I saw how the supposed omniscience of the spiritual teacher, who would know even from thousands of miles away that one is shirking chores, was functionally employed by interpreters to overcome laziness or shoddiness toward, and even develop pride in, work projects. Likewise, this invisible omniscience of the lama provided a sense of security, an emotional safety net, for interpreters who faced personal difficulties, not unlike an emotionally close but geographically distant friend in the secular world. Astrology provided interpreters with helpful roadmaps for navigating the confusions and obstacles of social living. My empathic involvement allowed me to comprehend that, contrary to much psychological theory, these behaviors and explanations of reality were often positive and healthy adaptations for interpreters, as they offered practitioners symbols that were psychologically integrative and 'progressive' in Obeyesekere's (1990) sense.
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In recognition of these boons for interpreters, the problem of divergent metaphysical world views appeared in a different light and actually lent multivocality to my final project.
Ethnographic data arose by my rejecting the 'methodological atheism' (Berger, 1967) Interpreters, unsurprisingly, did not maintain the simultaneous awareness of my dual roles of ethnographer and 'insider' like I did, so that the more I gave back to the community because I was an ethnographer, the more interpreters forgot that I was an ethnographer.
This created difficult dilemmas regarding unintentional exploitation by the ethnographer. Ethnographers, particularly of the reflexive ilk, will certainly continue to be bricoleurs to some degree. Perhaps this presentation will help to reduce the confusion, even terror, that ethnographers often feel as they 'put something of themselves' into their field research projects.
NOTES
1 Marcus and Fischer (1986: x) discuss this in terms of a current 'exhaustion with a paradigmatic style of discourse altogether' due to 'the enduring anthropological problem of what constitutes an adequate account of another culture in the face of contrasting interpretations' (ibid.: 3). Bromley and Carter (2001: 5-6) tell us that, 'There is no longer assured congruity of or conformity to conventions in the way field research and narrative construction are conducted...[individuals are] working from divergent perspectives, making ad hoc methodological decisions, and facing difficulty in determining what and how to report.' 2 A reader of a previous draft of this essay objected that what is termed 'empathy' here is not empathy at all, because for this reader empathy is anti-utilitarian, without an ulterior motive such as data collection. This reader mistakes compassion or sympathy for empathy. Compassion and sympathy are intrinsically concerned with the welfare of another person. And compassion and sympathy may, and perhaps even must, lack a utilitarian motive. On the other hand, the definition of empathy of 'cognition through the narcissistic investment of the other' (Kohut, 1978b: 701) gives no account as to why this cognition may or may not occur. Empathy for Kohut intrinsically concerns discerning contours of the experience of another person, their welfare aside, and as such may be quite utilitarian. Kohut's example of Nazi radio propaganda reveals precisely this difference. As well, should empathy always be without utilitarian motives, it could never be a tool in self psychological psychotherapy, in which discerning the contours of the experience of another is incumbent upon a therapist who bears the quite utilitarian motive of healing the client.
embrace the world view of karmic causation in a limited way. 10 Spickard (2002: 249) claims that 'ethnography's chief intention' is 'presenting an honest portrayal of others' lives.' This appears to imply an ethical duty to scholars, not just to interpreters, for the ethnographer. Misleading suppression of data for the sake of interpreters may violate honesty and trust. It may even harm interpreters in a larger perspective. For example, Donald Lopez (1998) describes how Tibetan people have been harmed not just by unrealistically negative, but also by unrealistically positive, portrayals of them in Western writings. For Lopez, unrealistically positive portrayals create, in the long term, unfair expectations of and negative outcomes for Tibetans who may or may not have benefited from these portrayals in the short term.
